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LICENSING INTELLECTUAL 
PROPERTY: COMPETITION AND 
DEFINITIONS OF ABUSE OF A 
DOMINANT POSITION IN THE UNITED 
STATES AND EUROPEAN UNION 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
t the crux of antitrust policy is the effort to ensure that 
companies do not maintain a monopoly over their respec-
tive markets1 by unacceptable means.2  However, where intel-
lectual property rights are at odds with competition law, the 
European Commission3 (“Commission”) favors maintaining ac-
cess to European Union (“EU”)4 markets over protecting the in-
tellectual property rights that may block market access.  Not-
withstanding the fact that a company endowed with a particu-
larly effective intellectual property right may make entry into a 
market difficult for competitors, it seems intuitively wrong to 
include legitimate means — especially regarding the use of a 
valid intellectual property right — under the umbrella of abu-
sive behavior.  In fact, to a great extent, an intellectual property 
right that results in market dominance is only performing its 
  
 1. Markets are variously defined, and the definition chosen has enormous 
implications when examining the use of an intellectual property right in rela-
tion to competition law in the European Union. 
 2. Robert Pitofsky, Challenges of the New Economy: Issues at the Intersec-
tion of Antitrust and Intellectual Property, 68 ANTITRUST L. J.  913, 914 (2001). 
 3. The European Commission is the executive body of the European Un-
ion. It “embodies and upholds the general interest of the Union,” through ini-
tiating draft legislation and along with the European Court of Justice, en-
forces Treaty and Community law while ensuring its proper application. See 
EUROPA, GATEWAY TO THE EUROPEAN UNION, at http://www.europa.eu.int/instit 
utions/index_en.htm (last visited Feb. 10, 2004).   
 4. The EU was created under the Treaty of Rome in 1957 and includes 
the United Kingdom, Greece, Sweden, Denmark, Austria, Finland, Republic of 
Ireland, Spain, Portugal, France, Germany, Italy, Belgium, Luxembourg, and 
the Netherlands. New Member states include the Czech Republic, Estonia, 
Cyprus, Latvia, Lithuania, Hungary, Malta, Poland, Slovenia, and Slovakia.  
See EUROPA, GATEWAY TO THE EUROPEAN UNION, at  http://europa.eu.int/ 
abc/index_en.htm (last visited Feb. 10, 2004). See also TERENCE PRIME, 
EUROPEAN INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 5 (2000).   
A 
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job.5  To consider it abusive when a dominant company refrains 
from licensing intellectual property to competitors is to under-
mine the foundation of the intellectual property right, which is 
in itself the right to exclusivity.  Moreover, to undermine the 
property right via forced licensing is to obliterate that right, for 
what is an intellectual property right if not an assurance of ex-
clusivity?6 Essentially, the intellectual property right is a 
mechanism for eliminating competition regarding a specific 
good or service.7  Therefore, at the outset, intellectual property 
law appears to conflict with competition law.8  
II.  FOUNDATIONS OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY PROTECTION 
At the most fundamental level, intellectual property rights 
are designed to reward the author or innovator with the fruits 
of his or her labor — a notion which derives from the Lockean 
concept of a person’s ownership over his or her labor.9  In a 
sense, the author of intellectual property is provided the legal 
  
 5. Paul D. Marquardt & Mark Leddy, Articles and Responses: The Essen-
tial Facilities Doctrine and Intellectual Property Rights: A Response to Pitof-
sky, Patterson, and Hooks, 70 ANTITRUST L.J. 847, 848 (2003).  The authors 
note:  
In particular, intellectual property rights acquired through produc-
tive investment in research and development are not forfeited simply 
because they may result in a decisive competitive advantage for the 
innovative product. The fundamental (and procompetitive) rationale 
for intellectual property protection is to foster innovation whether or 
not it creates a market advantage — or even market power — for the 
lawful duration of the right. 
Id. at 847.  The exclusive right to reproduction forms part of the author’s 
rights. See Cases 241 & 242/91P, Radio Telefis Eireann v. Commission, 1995 
C.M.L.R. 718 (1995).   
 6. James B. Kobak Jr., Antitrust Treatment of Refusals to License Intellec-
tual Property: Unilateral Refusal to License Intellectual Property and the Anti-
trust Laws, 566 PLI/PAT 517, 616–20 (2001) [hereinafter Kobak, Antritrust 
Treatment of Refusals] (citing Continental Paper Bag Co. v. Eastern Paper 
Bag Co., 210 U.S. 405, 429 (1908) holding that, in reference to patents, that 
the exclusive use of the patent “may be said to have been of the very essence 
of the right conferred by the patent, as it is the privilege of any owner of prop-
erty to use or not use it, without question of motive”). 
 7. GUY TRITTON, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN EUROPE 565 (2d ed. 2002).  
 8. Id. 
 9. Edwin C. Hettinger, Justifying Intellectual Property, 18 PHIL. & PUB. 
AFFAIRS 31–52 (1989).   
File: MegMacro.doc Created on: 2/13/2004 8:05 PM Last Printed: 3/26/2004 3:33 PM 
2004] LICENSING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 799 
 
right to exclude others from reaping the benefits from his work 
in exchange for giving the public access to the work in the first 
instance.10  The incentive to disclose a created work obviously 
benefits the public and encourages other members of society to 
learn and build on the ideas of others.11  The modern policy ele-
ments behind intellectual property rights specifically consider 
that those who invest time and resources into the development 
of a new technology, system or device should be rewarded with 
the exclusive right to profit from their investment.12  Without 
the right to exclusivity, there would be no incentive to continue 
expending these resources because the return on the invest-
ment would be minimal.13  Furthermore, without the exclusive 
opportunity to “exploit the invention” via intellectual property 
rights, there would be no mechanism through which the owner 
of the intellectual property right could guard against free riders 
taking advantage of the innovator’s research and development.14  
In the United States (“U.S.”), the aim of the Copyright Act15 is to 
“encourage the investment in the creation of desirable artistic 
and functional works of expression.”16  
Intellectual property owners will often readily license their 
works due to the tremendous expense attributed to manufactur-
ing, marketing and distributing a product on the market.17  
Through licensing, the innovator without the means to inde-
pendently profit from the protected innovation can reap finan-
  
 10. Id.  
 11. Id. 
 12. TRITTON, supra note 7, at 565.  See also Marquardt & Leddy, supra note 
5, at 856.  In particular Marquardt & Leddy state that: 
If innovation did not carry the promise of potential economic return, 
there would of course be much less of it.  For this reason alone, the 
essential facilities doctrine is, in Professor Areeda’s  words, ‘an epi-
thet in need of limiting principles.’  It cannot be used to force firms to 
surrender assets in which they have invested simply because those 
investments resulted in a significant competitive advantage. 
Id.   
 13. TRITTON, supra note 7, at 565.   
 14. STEVEN D. ANDERMAN, EC COMPETITION LAW AND INTELLECTUAL 
PROPERTY RIGHTS 5 (1998).  
 15. THE COPYRIGHT ACT, 17 U.S.C. §§ 101–810 (1988). 
 16. Kobak, Antritrust Treatment of Refusals, supra note 6, at 623.  
 17. TRITTON, supra note 7, at 563. 
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cial benefits.  Thus, licensing is also an incentive to innovate.18  
The motivation behind the decision to license, therefore, is to 
achieve optimal financial gains from the good or service.19  
Those who make the decision to abstain from entering into li-
censing agreements share this motivation, and yet the refusal 
to deal triggers competition law scrutiny.20  In analyzing the 
licensing of intellectual property rights, it is important to un-
derstand the effect that an intellectual property right has upon 
competition in a market.21  This effect is the focus of the in-
quiry.22   
III.  MARKET DEFINITIONS TODAY 
The nature of competition has changed in that competition 
within a given market has been replaced in many spheres by 
competition for the market.23  Although this new state of affairs 
may appear to warrant more stringent application of antitrust 
law, it is deceiving.  There may be less competition within mar-
kets because the composition and definitions of a “market” have 
changed.24  True, certain behemoth companies have emerged 
from globalization to vie with each other for domination of mar-
kets.25  However, in many instances, particularly involving new 
technologies and services, the market itself is new and, perhaps 
for this reason, the EU tends to define them more narrowly.26  
  
 18. ANDERMAN, EC COMPETITION LAW, supra note 14, at 6.  
 19. TRITTON, supra note 7, at 563. 
 20. Id. 
 21. Id. 
 22. Id. See also Kobak, Antritrust Treatment of Refusals, supra note 6, at 
616 (“Generally, an intellectual property owner with market power is under 
no obligation to license that property to others. This will generally be true 
even where a firm has achieved a monopoly position in a market as a result of 
its ownership of intellectual property.”).   
 23. Steve Anderman, EC Competition Law and Intellectual Property Rights 
in the New Economy, ANTITRUST BULL., June 22, 2002, at 285 [hereinafter 
Anderman, New Economy].  
 24. Id. See also Charles T. Compton & Scott A. Sher, Technology Mergers, 
INT’L FIN. L. REV. 1923, July 1, 2002, available at 2002 WL 14932920. 
 25. Id. 
 26. By narrowly defining the market, the European Union increases the 
chances that a market participant is dominant because there are fewer play-
ers in narrowly defined markets. See Anderman, New Economy, supra note 23, 
at 4 (explaining that “[o]nce the markets are narrowly defined, a finding of 
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In defining whether competition has been inhibited or abu-
sive conduct has occurred, the scope of the market must first be 
defined. In the EU, the Competition Directorate General of the 
European Commission27 (“DG Comp”) is charged with determin-
ing which market is “relevant” in the context of establishing 
whether a company is dominant in that market.28  This process 
involves either determining whether a certain good is inter-
changeable with others in a given market or applying a “test of 
sustainablility”29 which determines whether a change in price 
would result from the absence of other products in the market.30  
The potential result of requiring access to a newly drawn mar-
ket is two-fold: there is the possibility that participants will free 
ride, taking advantage of the innovations that savvy competi-
tors have achieved through expensive research and develop-
ment programs, and there is the possibility that the high vol-
ume of participants in the market will make it difficult to 
achieve the profit margins and growth necessary to sustain 
market participants without considerable resources.31  
The speed at which innovation moves forward is to some ex-
tent determined by the nature of the market in which it is de-
veloped.32  Along these lines, it is important to strike a balance 
with respect to the amount of companies that are encouraged to 
enter the market.33  This is important to ensure that the money 
available to support research and development is not spread too 
thin.34  Today, an array of new issues come to the fore regarding 
  
dominance can be reinforced where intellectual property rights operate as real 
barriers to entry.”).  
 27. Id. at 3. The DG Comp of the European Commission is charged with 
measuring the dominance exhibited in a particular market under EU law.  Id. 
 28. Anderman, New Economy, supra note 23, at 4.  
 29. Id. 
 30. Id. 
 31. Id. 
 32. DIRECTORATE FOR FINANCIAL, FISCAL AND ENTERPRISE AFFAIRS, 
COMMITTEE ON COMPETITION POLICY, COMPETITION POLICY AND INTELLECTUAL 
PROPERTY RIGHTS, available at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/34/57/1920398.p 
df (last visited Feb. 10, 2004) [hereinafter COMPETITION POLICY] (discussing  
the fact that “Shumpeter was the first to show that market structure has an 
effect on the pace of innovation. He went on to say that large monopolistic 
firms are ideally suited for introducing technology innovations that benefit 
society.”).   
 33. Id. 
 34. Id. 
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market definitions: “[a]ntitrust economists and enforcers have 
long struggled with the policy articulations appropriate to deal 
with perceived or actual potential competition — particularly in 
the technology age where products and markets change so 
quickly, new competitors may spring up overnight and innova-
tion plays such a critical competitive role.”35   
There are further temporal considerations when considering 
the effects of too much or too little competition within a market.  
Along with the broad notion that the U.S. tends to sanctify in-
tellectual property rights used within their statutory frame-
work,36 it is important to consider that the incentive to innovate, 
which underlies this approach, is also tied to notions about 
market participation and its long run effects on competition and 
innovation:37  
[T]he previous “short-run” view of competition authorities has 
been replaced by a longer-run view, which acknowledges that 
technological progress contributes at least as much to social 
welfare as does the elimination of allocative inefficiencies from 
non-competitive prices.  There is, therefore, a growing willing-
ness to allow restrictions on competition today in order to 
promote competition in new products and processes tomor-
row.38 
Just as it is essential to create standards of conduct by which 
companies can gauge their behavior, it is equally vital that 
market definitions be clear and consistent.39  It is also important 
for markets to not be defined in a way that would facilitate easy 
  
 35. Compton & Sher, supra note 24. 
 36. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE & FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, ANTITRUST 
GUIDELINES FOR THE LICENSING OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY (1995), available at 
http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/guidelines/ipguide.htm (last visited Feb 10, 
2004). “If a patent or other form of intellectual property does confer market 
power, that market power does not by itself offend the antitrust laws. As with 
any other tangible or intangible asset that enables its owner to obtain signifi-
cant supracompetitive profits, market power (or even a monopoly) that is 
solely ‘a consequence of a superior product, business acumen, or historic acci-
dent’ does not violate the antitrust laws. Nor does such market power impose 
on the intellectual property owner an obligation to license the use of that 
property to others.’” Id. 
 37. Willard K. Tom, Background Note, COMPETITION POLICY, supra note 32, 
at 274.  
 38. Id. 
 39. Anderman, New Economy, supra note 23, at 11. 
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determinations of abusive behavior.40  An example of such a 
situation is where complex products are broken down into com-
ponent parts.41  This narrow definition of a market makes it dif-
ficult — particularly where component parts are protected by 
intellectual property rights — to avoid an “abusive” characteri-
zation.42  The U.S. position is that “market power does not by 
itself offend antitrust law.”43  Even when huge profits are 
reaped and the intellectual property owner establishes a near 
monopoly on the market, this result is legitimate where it stems 
from the valid use of an intellectual property right.44 
  
 40. Id.  Anderman describes the arbitrary nature of the EU’s market defi-
nitions.   
The methods used by EC competition can be attacked on the grounds 
that their choice of markets is sometimes arbitrary, their findings of 
dominance is sometimes suspect and their definitions of abuse ignore 
the full entitlement of IPR holders to obtain what the market will 
bear. 
Id. 
 41. Id. at 4.  See also Mark D. Powell, Competition Law and Innovation: 
The Interface between Competition Law and Intellectual Property, 708 
PLI/PAT 57 (2002) [hereinafter Powell, Competition Law and Innovation]. 
Using IBM as an example, the author explains that “[p]rior to the Commission 
intervention, IBM supplied an integrated family of products (i.e. printers, 
storage devices, disk drives, software applications) which could work on its 
dominant System/370 platform for microcomputers. Arguably each component 
represented a separate market.”  Id. 
 42. Anderman, New Economy, supra note 23, at 4. 
If however a product is a complex product, such as a web browser in-
tegrated with a Windows desktop platform or a “system” consisting of 
component parts, there is an initial issue of discretion  in detemin- 
ing whether the relevant product with which to begin the process of 
defining a market  is the complex product or a component thereof. To 
the extent that DG Comp opts to start its  market definition with co- 
mponents as separate products rather than complex products, it 
makes it easier to find dominance. 
Id.  
 43. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE & FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, ANTITRUST 
GUIDELINES FOR THE LICENSING OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY (1995), available at 
http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/guidelines/ipguide.htm (last visited Feb 10. 
2004).  See also Kobak, Antritrust Treatment of Refusals, supra note 6, at 639 
(commenting on the Guidelines “lack of a mandatory duty to license” intellec-
tual property as it contradicts certain recent enforcement actions, such as a 
1998 FTC action against Intel).   
 44. Id. See also U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE & FEDERAL TRADE 
COMMISSION, ANTITRUST GUIDELINES FOR THE LICENSING OF INTELLECTUAL 
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IV.   GOALS OF COMPETITION: COMPETING  PERSPECTIVES 
The EU’s fundamental perspective on the nature of competi-
tion, as a means to an end instead of as an end in itself, di-
verges from U.S. policy.  At its core, the different approaches 
exhibited by the EU and the U.S. stem from differing views of 
what constitutes “economic freedom,” how it is valued, and how 
it should be facilitated.45  The U.S. espouses keeping an eye on 
the ultimate goal of reducing interstate barriers, facilitating 
market participation and enhancing the consumer benefits that 
competition may spawn.46  The U.S. seems to view competition 
as a goal in itself.  Therefore U.S. policy allows markets to cor-
rect themselves, assuming that the benefits down the line will 
accrue based on the survival and demise of competitors accord-
ing to the strength of their products and the related public de-
mand for them.47  
Along these lines, the U.S. requires proof that a substantial 
decrease in competition will result from an entity’s inability to 
  
PROPERTY (1995), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/guidelines/ip 
guide.htm (last visited Feb 10. 2004).   
If a patent or other form of intellectual property does confer market 
power, that market power  does not by itself offend antitrust law. As 
with any other tangible or intangible asset that enables its owner to 
obtain significant supracompetitive profits, market power (or even 
monopoly) that is  solely a consequence of a superior product, busi-
ness acumen, or historic accident does not violate  the antitrust laws. 
Nor does such market power impose on the intellectual property 
owner an obligation to license the use of that property to others. As in 
other antitrust contexts, however,  market power could be illegally ac-
quired or maintained, or even if lawfully acquired and maintained, 
would be relevant to the ability of an intellectual property owner to 
harm competition  through unreasonable conduct in connection with 
such property.  
Id.  
 45. SIMON J. EVERETT ET AL., ANTITRUST GOES GLOBAL: WHAT FUTURE FOR 
TRANSATLANTIC COOPERATION? 117 (2000).   
 46. Robert G. Badal & Hilary E. Ware, E.U.’s Differing Approach, THE 
NAT’L L.J., Jan. 28, 2002, at A15.   “These competition rules apply to the en-
forcement of intellectual property rights and reflect the European Union’s 
general view that competition is a means to an end in community law, not an 
end in itself.”  Id. (discussing the EU’s competition rules 85–90 in the Treaty 
of Rome).  
 47. Id. 
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enter the market.48  The EU stops short of this analysis by fa-
voring the restriction of those who block the access of individual 
competitors, regardless of any proof of a substantial impact on 
competition in a broader sense.49  Even more, the U.S. policy 
considers evidence that the lack of competition in a market off-
sets “efficiency benefits.”50  In the interest of economic freedom, 
the EU has been more likely to favor broadening the participa-
tion in each market as much as possible: “[h]istorically, the con-
cern of Community competition law was to prohibit restraints of 
any form on a person’s economic freedom, i.e., the right of that 
person to choose how he behaves in a particular market.”51 
The U.S. places emphasis on the integrity of the intellectual 
property right by granting owners total discretion regarding the 
licensing of their protected intellectual property right.52  This is 
chiefly the case in patent law, where allowing exclusivity and 
preserving the incentive to innovate is particularly important 
because of the relatively large amount of capital committed by 
companies to research and development.53  The U.S. patent 
  
 48. EVERETT, supra note 45, at 118.  “In sum, European competition policy 
is satisfied that an arrangement should be prohibited upon proof that it may 
significantly restrict one or more competitors’ ability to access or expand its 
operations in a market; U.S. antitrust law goes a step further, requiring proof 
that such harm is also likely to lessen competition substantially.”  Id. (discuss-
ing competing policy in the context of vertical arrangements).  
 49. Id.  
 50. Id. at 124 (discussing the Commission regulation on vertical agree-
ments).  The author comments that the EU approach to competition policy 
“reveals the Commission’s continuing concern to prohibit arrangements sim-
ply because they may significantly restrict competitors’ access to a market 
along with a new receptivity to a more strictly competition-oriented test.” Id.  
 51. TRITTON, supra note 7, at 566. 
 52. In re Indep. Serv. Orgs., 203 F.3d 1322, 1327–28 (Fed. Cir. 2000), cert. 
denied, CSU, L.L.C. v. Xerox Corp., 121 S. Ct. 1077 (2001). The court held: 
In the absence of any illegal tying, fraud in the Patent and Trade-
mark Office, or sham litigation, the patent holder may enforce the 
statutory right to exclude others from making, using or selling  the cl- 
aimed invention free from liability under the antitrust laws. We 
therefore will not inquire into his subjective motivation for exerting 
his statutory rights, even though his refusal to sell or license his pat-
ent invention may have an anti-competitive effect, so long as that 
anti-competitive effect is not illegally extended beyond the statutory 
patent grant. 
Id.  
 53. TRITTON, supra note 7, at 571. 
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statute testifies to this position by expressly providing that re-
fusal to license is not a misuse or illegal extension of the patent 
right.54 This position is also evident throughout the antitrust 
enforcement agencies’ Guidelines for the Licensing of Intellec-
tual Property, which states that the owner will not be required 
“to create competition in its own technology.”55  
The Federal Trade Commission holds the view that “great re-
spect for and concern about protecting incentives to innovate” is 
the U.S. priority when considering the practical application of 
intellectual property rights and antitrust principles.56  This is 
important in part because it is difficult to gauge just how the 
incentive to innovate is effected through governmental policy 
and legislation.57  Evidence is presently emerging that the EU 
has begun to embrace the goals of encouraging investment and 
preserving the incentive to innovate; however, these are recent 
developments.58  Whereas in the U.S., focus on the preservation 
of incentives shaped its antitrust policy and resulting statutory 
construction and application, in the EU “the need to avoid free 
riding and to encourage investment had limited influence on 
competition law until, with the creation of the merger task force 
in 1989, the competition department of the Commission of the 
EU began to respect economists more.”59  As the competition law 
in the EU evolves, therefore, the values at the forefront of the 
  
 54. John J.P. Howley, Patent-Antitrust Nexus Being Studied, 227 N.Y. L.J. 
91, sec. 12, col. 1 (May 13, 2002); Infringement of Patents, 35 U.S.C. § 
271(d)(4) (1988).    
 55. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE & FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, ANTITRUST 
GUIDELINES FOR THE LICENSING OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY § 3.1 (1995), avail-
able at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/guidelines/ipguide.htm (last visited 
Feb 10. 2004). 
 56. See Pitofsky, supra note 2, at 924. 
 57. Id. at 3 (responding to the argument that “[b]ecause effects on incen-
tives to innovate are hard to measure, government should pursue a cautious 
or even hands-off policy” with the contention that the combination of antitrust 
law’s protection of innovation and intellectual property right protection’s re-
wards for innovation can “create incentives to introduce new products.”). 
 58. Valentine Korah, Symposium, The Federal Circuit and Antitrust: The 
Interface between Intellectual Property and Antitrust: The European Experi-
ence, 69 ANTITRUST L.J. 801, 803 n.10 (2002). “There have always been a few 
officials who were concerned about incentives to investment…until the last 
decade or so, however, they were in the minority and there was little evidence 
of their influence over the treatment of intellectual property rights.”   Id. 
 59. Id. at 803.   
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U.S. competition policies are beginning to find a place in EU 
law.  
The motivating factors behind the Commission’s approach in-
clude a focus on policy concerns regarding protection for 
smaller, less powerful and less global businesses and ostensibly 
the consumer,60 as well as the nature of the antitrust and intel-
lectual property legislation itself, or lack thereof.61  The EU’s 
divergence with the U.S. approach to intellectual property 
rights and competition policy has its roots in the history of anti-
trust and intellectual property laws themselves.  In the U.S., 
intellectual property rights and antitrust law derive from the 
common foundation of federal law.62  In the EU, intellectual 
property rights stem from the domestic laws of member states,63 
while competition law is rooted in the Treaty of Rome 
(“Treaty”).64  At this stage, there are only community-wide intel-
lectual property rights in the realm of trademarks, biotechno-
logical inventions, and plant variety rights.65  These disparate 
legal constructions are largely the result of the historical basis 
for the respective systems of law.66  
  
 60. Id. 
 61. Id. 
 62. Korah, supra note 58, at 804. 
 63. Magill, 4  C.M.L.R. 718, [1995] 1 C.E.C. 400 (E.C.J.), para. 49, citing 
Case 238/87, AB Volvo v. Erik Veng (UK) Ltd., ECR 6211 at 6235, 4 C.M.L.R. 
122 (1988) (paras 7–8):  
Admittedly, in the absence of Community standardization or har-
monization of laws, determination of the conditions and procedures 
for granting protection of an intellectual property right is a matter for 
national rules. Further, the exclusive right of reproduction forms part 
of the author’s rights, so that refusal to grant a license, even if it is 
the act of an undertaking holding a dominant position, cannot in it-
self constitute an abuse of a dominant position. 
Id.   The position the Court of Justice takes here is obviously at odds with that 
of the DG Comp in its attempt to force IMS to license its copyrighted data-
base. The European Union does not have a system of stare decisis — prior 
decisions are merely persuasive and are not formally precedential.   Id.  
 64. Trademark rights, however, are covered by community-wide laws.  
Alderman, New Economy, supra note 23, at 11. Treaty Establishing the Euro-
pean Community (Mar. 25, 1957), available at http://europa.eu.int/eur-lex/en/ 
treaties/dat/C_2002325EN.003301.html (last visited Feb. 10, 2004). 
 65. Ian Forrester Q.C., submitted by David A. Balto, Abuse of Intellectual 
Property as an Abuse of Dominance: Views Across the Atlantic, 708 PLI/PAT 
35, 37 (2002) [hereinafter Forrester, Abuse of Intellectual Property].  
 66. Id. 
File: MegMacro.doc Created on:  2/13/2004 8:05 PM Last Printed: 3/26/2004 3:33 PM 
808 BROOK. J. INT’L L. [Vol. 29:2 
 
While the U.S. enjoyed economic integration during the in-
ception of the Sherman Act,67 the EU was wary of isolating 
states from one another via intellectual property right protec-
tion: “Intellectual property rights were seen as the way by 
which companies might partition the common market to pre-
vent free movement of goods between the 6 (and latterly the 9) 
Member States.”68  In response, the EU applied competition law 
in a way that risks impairing the integrity of intellectual prop-
erty rights.69  Along these lines, nationally rooted intellectual 
property rights are preempted by the Treaty to the extent that 
they conflict with the terms of the Treaty.  
V.  STATUTORY STRUCTURE OF COMPETITION LAW 
In the EU, intellectual property rights are considered in two 
ways — in one sense they are evaluated based on their function 
of maintaining the integrity of the protected innovation,70 and in 
another sense they are considered according to their use.71  The 
former is the subject of national law, but the latter is governed 
by the Treaty’s competition laws and could therefore be chal-
lenged under rules related to the free movement of goods 
throughout the EU.72  This distinction was developed through 
case law in the EU to reconcile the conflict that arose when a 
nationally vested right is threatened with nullification by com-
munity-wide law.73  In the Centrafarm cases in particular, the 
European Court’s method of analysis regarding the use of intel-
lectual property rights as it relates to the unhindered move-
ment of goods evolved to create this “existence” and “use” dis-
tinction.74  At the same time, the court attempted to ensure that 
  
 67. Id. 
 68. Forrester, Abuse of Intellectual Property, supra note 65.   
 69. “When Congress passed the Sherman Act, the United States was 
largely economically integrated: it enjoyed a single currency and federal intel-
lectual property rights. None of these characteristics applied in Europe in the 
1960’s and 1970’s when the law was being developed.” Korah, supra note 58, 
at 804.  
 70. COMPETITION LAW, supra note 32, at 275. 
 71. Id. 
 72. Id. 
 73. Forrester, Abuse of Intellectual Property, supra note 65, at 39 (discuss-
ing the evolution of the existence and exercise distinction). 
 74. Case 15/74, Centrafram BV v. Sterling Drug Inc., 1974 E.C.R. 1147, 
(1974); Darren E. Donnelly, Parallel Trade and International Harmonization 
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benefits from rights did not extend indefinitely at the expense 
of the integrity of the market.75  Although the “core of the intel-
lectual property right” was immune from challenge, the adjoin-
ing rights were not.76  This paradigm raises the question that if 
an intellectual property right is not the right to exploit the dis-
covery or development exclusively by placing the protected 
product or service on the market, then what is it?  Is it an intel-
lectual property “right” at all without exclusive use?77  
Articles 8178 and 8279 are the competition provisions of the 
Treaty that govern the use, and potential abuse, of intellectual 
property rights.80  Article 81 of the Treaty bars agreements that 
adversely affect trade between member states through the re-
striction of competition.81  In regulating agreements between 
  
of the Exhaustion of Rights Doctrine, 13 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. 
L.J. 445, 476 (1997).  
Centrafarm v. Sterling Drug first held that national patent rights 
were exhausted with respect to  products marketed in another mem-
ber state by the patentee or with its consent. The issue before the 
court was whether the policy in favor of the free movement of goods 
in Article 30 of the EEC Treaty prohibited the use of Dutch patent 
law to prevent parallel imports of Negram originally marketed in 
Britain by Sterling's subsidiary. The ECJ reiterated the distinction 
between the existence and exercise of IPR, noting that only the spe-
cific subject matter of the IPR was safeguarded by Article 36. 
Id.   
 75. Case 16/74, Centrafarm v. Winthrop, 1974 ECR 1183 (1974); Case 
15/74, Centrafarm v. Sterling Drug, 1974 ECR 1147 (1974).  Here the court 
developed the doctrine of exhaustion.  See infra notes 150–54 and accompany-
ing text. 
 76. Forrester, Abuse of Intellectual Property, supra note 65, at 39.  
 77. JAY DRATLER, JR., INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW: COMMERCIAL, 
CREATIVE, AND INDUSTRIAL PROPERTY § 1.07 (2003).  “The term ‘infringement’ 
has a distinct meaning for each type of intellectual property. Each form of 
intellectual property protection confers certain exclusive rights upon the intel-
lectual property owner, and anyone else’s unauthorized exercise of those 
rights constitutes infringement.”  Id.    
 78. EUROPA, GATEWAY TO THE EUROPEAN UNION, ARTICLE 81 OF THE EC 
TREATY (FORMERLY ARTICLE 85), available at http://europa.eu.int/eur-lex/en/ 
treaties/selected/livre 218.html#anArt1 (last visited Feb. 10, 2004).  
 79. EUROPA, GATEWAY TO THE EUROPEAN UNION, ARTICLES 82 (FORMERLY 
ARTICLE 86) OF THE EC TREATY, available at http://europa.eu.int/eur-lex/en/ 
treaties/selected/livre218.html#anArt1 (last visited Feb. 10, 2004).  
 80. Korah, supra note 58, at 823.   
 81. Treaty of Amsterdam Amending the Treaty on European Union, The 
Treaties Establishing the European Communities and Certain Related Acts, 
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companies, Article 81 is a relatively broad restriction that 
speaks to the free market policy of the EU, and endeavors to 
prevent alliances that may preclude the entrance or viability of 
other market participants.82  In analyzing the competitive ef-
fects of intellectual property licensing, EU law includes an in-
quiry into the effect of the intellectual property right itself, and 
its licensing, simultaneously.83 
Article 82 of the Treaty prohibits the abuses associated with 
those who have already achieved dominant positions in the 
market.84 Although market dominance is allowed under the 
Treaty, those that do dominate the market are called upon to 
remain acutely aware of the effects this position has on the rest 
of the market.85  Both of these provisions, and indeed the Treaty 
in a broad sense, aim to encourage the free movement of goods 
and services among the member states, preventing their isola-
tion from one another, while Article 82 more specifically gov-
erns the licensing of intellectual property rights.86   
  
Oct. 2, 1997, 1997 O.J. (C 340), 37 I.L.M. 56, incorporated into the Treaty 
Establishing the European Community, Feb. 7, 1992, O.J. (C 224) 1 (1992), 
[1992] 1 C.M.L.R. 573 (1992), art. 141(4) (as in effect in 1999).  As of May 
1999, the Amsterdam Treaty’s provisions have been incorporated into both the 
EC Treaty and the Treaty on European Union.  The Treaty of Amsterdam 
changed the Article numbers of the Treaty from 85 to 81 and 82 to 86. 
 82. Anderman,  New Economy, supra note 23, at 2. 
 83. TRITTON, supra note 7, at 564.  
In combining the two stages, Community law has implicitly consid-
ered the competitive effect of  intellectual property laws themselves as 
well as their licensing. In doing so, they have historically tended to 
take a restrictive view as to the procompetitive effects of licensing by 
questioning the  validity of intellectual property rights themselves 
with regard to competition. 
Id. 
 84. EUROPA, GATEWAY TO THE EUROPEAN UNION, ARTICLE 82 (FORMERLY 
ARTICLE 86) OF THE EC TREATY, available at http://europa.eu.int/eur-lex/en/ 
treaties/selected/livre 218.html#anArt1 (last visited Jan. 5, 2004). “Any abuse 
by one or more undertakings of a dominant position shall be incompatible 
with the common market insofar as it may affect trade between member 
states.”  Id.   
 85. Anderman, New Economy, supra note 23, at 2, 12. 
 86. Anderman explains: 
The examples of abuse given in article 82 include unfair pricing, dis-
criminatory pricing and tie ins. However, article 82 also extends to 
such abuses as exclusive dealing, predatory pricing,  refusals to sup-
ply and license. The latter two, which are particularly applicable to 
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Article 36 of the Treaty governs the interplay between the 
community-wide competition law and national intellectual 
property rights87 by balancing the protection of intellectual 
property and the preservation of free competition in the com-
munity:  
[T]he reconciliation between the requirements of the free 
movement of goods and the respect to which intellectual prop-
erty rights were entitled had to be achieved in such a way as 
to protect the legitimate exercise of such rights, which alone 
was justified within the meaning of that article, and to pre-
clude any improper exercise thereof likely to create artificial 
partitions within the market or pervert the rules of governing 
competition within the Community.88 
VI.  THE FUTURE OF BLOCK EXEMPTIONS  
Intellectual property licensing is governed by the Technology 
Transfer Block Exemption Regulation (“TTBE Regulation”) es-
tablished in 1996.89  The regulation is essentially a formal man-
date, which provides that those with intellectual property rights 
use them in accordance with the competition articles in the 
Treaty, especially Article 81.90  Although the regulation ostensi-
  
intellectual property right holders appear to be authorized by article 
82(b) which declares it to be an abuse to limit production, markets or 
technical development to the prejudice of consumers”. 
Id. at 3.   
 87. EUROPA, GATEWAY TO THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY, ARTICLE 36 OF THE EC 
TREATY, available at http://europa.eu.int/comm/competition/legislation/trea-
ties/ec/art36_en.html (last visited Feb. 5, 2004).    
 88. Cases 241 & 242/91P, Radio Telefis Eireann v. Commission, 1995 
C.M.L.R. 718 (1995).  
 89. EUROPA, GATEWAY TO THE EUROPEAN UNION, TRANSFER OF TECHNOLOGY 
BLOCK EXEMPTION REGULATION 240/96, available at http://europa.eu.int/smar-
tapi/cgi/sga_doc?smartapi!celexapi!prod!CELEXnumdoc&lg=EN&numdoc=319
96R0240&model=guichett  (last visited Feb. 5, 2004). 
 90. Anderman, New Economy, supra note 23, at 10 (discussing the mar-
riage of EU competition law and the exercise of intellectual property rights).  
“The current regulation thus adds to a picture of close regulation of intellec-
tual property by EU competition law. Unless the clauses in intellectual prop-
erty right licensing agreements conform strictly to the detailed requirements 
of the individual articles in the regulation, either the agreement as a whole or 
the individual clause will be void and unenforceable.”  Id.   
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bly applies specifically to the licensing of “pure patents, pure 
know-how, or both,” there are existing ancillary provisions re-
lating to other intellectual property rights.91  However, there are 
no provisions meant expressly for the licensing of trademarks or 
copyrights.92  
Pursuant to Article 12 of the TTBE Regulation, the Commis-
sion is required to draw up a report regarding the effectiveness 
of the regulation and to propose appropriate changes.93  In the 
December 2001 report, it was proposed that trademarks and 
designs should be included, and that a move towards a more 
“economic” approach that is more broad than the original regu-
lation,94 and more “user friendly,” would be appropriate.95   
Nevertheless, as it stands the TTBE Regulation does not 
cover copyright and trademarks standing alone, and therefore 
exemption from Article 81 scrutiny is often a “long and labori-
ous process” for many companies whose technology is not pro-
tected by patent.96  It is possible to maneuver outside of this 
mandate by petitioning the Commission, but exception to the 
transfer block exemption is extremely difficult to achieve.97  The 
response to comments submitted regarding the December 2001 
report describe the various arguments for and against including 
copyright, trademark and design rights in the TTBE Regula-
tion.98  Arguments for including a wider array of intellectual 
property rights include the suggestion that it would make ap-
plication easier and that would allow companies to avoid com-
plicated inquiries into which intellectual property rights are 
ancillary and which stand alone.99 Opponents of adding intellec-
  
 91. Korah, supra note 58, at 832. 
 92. Id. 
 93. EUROPA, GATEWAY TO THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY, TRANSFER OF 
TECHNOLOGY BLOCK EXEMPTION REGULATION NO. 240/96, available at http://eu-
ropa.eu.int/smartapi/cgi/sga_doc?smartapi!celexapi!prod!CELEXnumdoc&lg=
EN&numdoc=31996R0240&model=guichett (last visited Jan. 5, 2004).   
 94. EUROPA, GATEWAY TO THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY, ANNEX 1, SUMMARY OF 
SUBMISSIONS ON TTBE REVIEW REPORT, available at http://europa.eu.int/comm 
/competition/antitrust/technologytransfer/summaryofcomments.pdf (last vis-
ited Jan. 5, 2004) [hereinafter ANNEX 1]. 
 95. Korah, supra note 58, at 832.  
 96. Anderman, New Economy, supra note 23, at 10.  
 97. Id. 
 98. ANNEX 1, supra note 93, at 2.  
 99. Id.  See also Korah, supra note 58, at 832.  
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tual property rights to the regulation believe that each intellec-
tual property right has a different antitrust implication and 
therefore should be treated differently.100   
Defining markets is again important in considering the appli-
cation of the TTBE Regulation.101 The Commission acknowl-
edges that it becomes difficult to define the market, particularly 
in the realm of intellectual property rights which are tied to 
technological innovations.102  Particularly where licensing occurs 
with new products and technologies, “market share thresholds” 
could be deceiving — possibly stifling licensing and innova-
tion.103 
The competition laws in the Treaty mirror the Sherman Act 
in construction, but the practical application of the articles in 
the EU differ from the way in which antitrust statutes are util-
ized in the U.S.104  The Commission monitors the effects a domi-
nant company has on its markets for the purpose of ensuring 
that other companies are able to engage in competition along-
side dominant market members.105  In contrast, the U.S. more 
readily employs a laissez faire approach where the focus is on 
maintaining a system of competition for the benefit of consum-
ers and the encouragement of innovation, instead of looking out 
  
 100. ANNEX 1, supra note 94, at 2. 
 101. Id. 
 102. Id. 
 103. Id. at 3.   
 104. James B. Kobak, Jr., Running the Gauntlet: Antitrust and Intellectual 
Property Pitfalls on the Two Sides of the Atlantic, 64 ANTITRUST L.J. 341, 344–
47, 354 (1996).  Kobak explains: 
Even though the prima facie elements to finding antitrust liability 
under the essential facilities  doctrine are similar in the EU and U.S., 
the elements have been applied differently in their respective juris-
dictions. Notwithstanding this difference, in both the EU and U.S. it 
is difficult to  rely on the essential facilities doctrine to force a domi-
nant owner to license its IPRs. 
Id. See also Sergio Baches Opi, The Application of the Essential Facilities Doc-
trine to Intellectual Property Licensing in the European Union and the United 
States: Are Intellectual Property Rights Still Sacrosanct? 11 FORDHAM INTELL. 
PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 409, 414 (2001). 
 105. The European Commission has historically aimed to protect small and 
medium sized firms in particular, but recently the Commission has begun to 
recognize the long term benefits not just for these small or medium sized com-
panies, but for consumers and the economy in a broader sense.  Korah, supra 
note 58, at 804.  
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for market participants individually.106  Along these lines, the 
Commission will go so far as to mandate the licensing of intel-
lectual property rights where a dominant company’s refusal to 
license is deemed abusive and results in the restriction of com-
petition.107  However, absent fraud and illegal tying, the “statu-
tory right to exclude others” in the U.S. is not conditioned upon 
a company’s effect on the market.108  
VII.  COMMON LAW EXPRESSIONS OF STATUTORY POLICY 
Two recent cases, one in the U.S. and one in the EU, demon-
strate just how bipolar the two approaches can be.  Generally, 
the U.S. takes the view that an intellectual property owner is 
not required to license that intellectual property right to other 
companies.109  This is true regardless of whether the right has 
caused the company to gain a monopoly in the market.110  In In-
dependent Services Organizations Antitrust Litigation (“Xerox”), 
Xerox refused to license its patented parts and copyrighted 
software to independent service organizations, effectively elimi-
nating them from the service market.111  The Supreme Court 
held that, even though “refusal to deal impacts competition in 
more than one market,” Xerox could retain its right to refuse to 
license to competitors. This decision, although considered ex-
treme by some,112 highlights the relative power of intellectual 
  
 106. See Pitofsky, supra note 1, at 923–24.  See also In re Indep. Serv. Orgs. 
Antitrust Litigation, 203 F.3d 1322, 1327 (Fed. Cir. 2000), cert. denied, C.S.U., 
L.L.C. v. Xerox Corp., 121 S.Ct. 1077 (2001). 
 107. Robert G. Badal & Hilary E. Ware, E.U.’s Differing Approach, NAT’L L. 
J., Jan. 28, 2002, at A15. 
 108. In re Indep. Serv. Orgs. Antitrust Litigation, 203 F.3d at 1327; The 
Federal Trade Commission, Timothy Murris (prepared remarks of the FTC 
Chairman), Competition and Intellectual Property Policy: The Way Ahead, 
Nov. 2001, available at http://www.ftc.gov/speeches/muris/intellectual.htm.   
 109. Kobak, Antritrust Treatment of Refusals, supra note 6, at 616. 
 110. Id. 
 111. In re Indep. Serv. Orgs., 203 F.3d at 1327.    
 112. See Pitofsky, supra note 1, at 919–20.  Pitofsky, concerned that the 
invocation of intellectual property rights would become a facile response to 
challenges of a refusal to deal, comments on the Xerox case, “[T]he court 
reached its decision in sweeping language that exalts patent and copyright 
rights over other considerations and throws into doubt the validity of previous 
lines of authority that attempted to strike a balance between intellectual 
property and antitrust.”  Id.  
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property rights in the U.S., and the disinclination courts have 
to equate market power with the duty to license.113  
In an apparent move in the opposite direction, in 2002, the 
Commission forced IMS, a pharmaceutical marketing company, 
to license its copyrighted database to participants in the nar-
rowly defined market114 of pharmaceutical sales data services in 
Germany.115  The case116 demonstrates the relatively extreme 
measures the Commission is willing to employ in an effort to 
protect smaller, less powerful market participants.117  It is true, 
however, that although even in the realm of copyright the U.S. 
policy refrains from forced licensing, the Commission may have 
more aggressively handled IMS Health’s refusal to deal because 
  
 113. In re Indep. Serv. Orgs., 203 F.3d at 1326, (citing Intergraph Corp. v. 
Intel Corp., 195 F.3d 1346, 1362 (Fed. Cir. 1999) as demonstrating that “mar-
ket power does not impose on the intellectual property owner an obligation to 
license the use of that property to others”).   
 114. “The Commission defined the relevant market as the market for ‘Ger-
man regional sales data services’ and found that IMS, by virtue of its large 
market share, occupied a dominant position in this market.” David W. Hull et 
al., Compulsory Licensing, THE EUR. ANTITRUST REV., 36–39 (2002).   
 115. Case COMP D/338.044, NDC Health/IMS Health: Interim Measures 
(July 3, 2001); Case T-184/01 R, IMS Health Inc. v. Commission (Aug. 10, 
2001), confirmed after oral hearing, Oct. 26, 2001.  
 116. As of October of 2002, the Court of First Instance has closed its investi-
gation of IMS Health Inc.’s “pharmaceutical sales and prescriptions data col-
lection practices.” AFX Financial News, EU Drops Inquiry into US’ IMS 
Health Sales Practices, available at http://www.afxnews.com  (last visited Jan. 
5, 2004).  
 117. Julian  Epstein, The Other Side of Harmony: Can Trade and Competi-
tion Laws Work Together in the International Marketplace?, 17 AM. U. INT’L L. 
REV. 343, 360 (2002): 
The underlying policies of European Commission competition law are 
distinctly different from those of the United States, and other non-
European countries. U.S. antitrust laws are concerned largely with 
optimizing marketplace efficiencies by protecting against concerted 
actions to increase prices or reduce output (as stated infra, for exam-
ple, dominant firms in the U.S. are free under antitrust laws to “com-
pete hard,” and to engage in such schemes as “refusals to deal” and 
other exclusionary practices so long as there are legitimate efficiency 
rationales.) The Europeans have rejected many of the U.S. competi-
tion paradigms in favor of greater protections for smaller and mid-
sized firms requiring, for example, that market share as low as forty 
percent can trigger “must deal” requirements with horizontal or ver-
tical competitors.  
Id.  
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it involved copyright instead of patent.118 Keeping in mind the 
“creative effort of the rightholder and the economic advantages 
flowing from the exercise of the right,” there may be less incen-
tive for the Commission to protect those rights that do not di-
rectly spur investment in research and development.119  
There is no need to make a “definitive finding that an in-
fringement has occurred” for the Commission to impose interim 
measures.120  However, in temporarily suspending the decision 
to force IMS to license its copyright, the Court of First Instance 
demonstrated wariness at the notion of such a harsh remedy 
without further investigation of the facts and legal issues.121  
Ultimately, in the EU the facts of each case are determinative 
of which way the Commission and courts will lean — where the 
“creative effort” is not there, the view is that there is no need to 
give incentive for innovation.122 
The Court of First Instance invoked Article 295 of the Treaty, 
which guarantees that the Treaty will not interfere with the 
property ownership of member states:123 
In the present case, it is first appropriate to recall that Article 
295 EC provides that ‘This Treaty shall in no way prejudice 
the rules in the Member States governing the system of prop-
erty ownership’. It follows from Article 295 EC that a judge 
hearing an application for interim measures should normally 
treat with circumspection a Commission decision imposing, by 
way of interim measures taken in the course of a pending in-
vestigation under Article 3 of Regulation No. 17, an obligation 
upon the proprietor of an intellectual property right recog-
nized and protected by national law to license the use of that 
property right.124 
Although the court temporarily reigned in the decision to im-
pose interim measures, the Commission’s move to force IMS to 
license its intellectual property demonstrates an expansion of 
  
 118. Powell, Competition Law and Innovation, supra note 41, at 52. 
 119. Id. 
 120. Case COMP D/338.044, NDC Health/IMS Health: Interim Measures 
(July 3, 2001); Case T-184/01 R, IMS Health Inc. v. Commission (Aug. 10, 
2001), confirmed after oral hearing, Oct. 26, 2001.  
 121. Id. at 176.  
 122. Powell, Competition Law and Innovation, supra note 41, at 52. 
 123. Id. 
 124. Case T-184/01 R, IMS Health Inc., 173–74. 
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the scope of Article 82 that eclipses intellectual property rights 
exercised in the EU.125  
The relevant case law illustrates that EU courts are called 
upon to balance the interests of protecting the nationally-
endowed intellectual property right with the policies espoused 
and enforced by competition law found in the Treaty.126  When 
examining the relationship between a company’s intellectual 
property right and its position in the market, the courts fre-
quently invoke the “essential facilities doctrine.”127  This doc-
trine is applied to determine whether a company has control 
over a facility essential to competing in the market and, if so, 
whether the company has prevented competitors from using the 
facility to block access to the market.128  An intellectual property 
right owner is ripe for “essential facilities” analysis when the 
company refuses to license the right and/or is reaping tremen-
dous economic benefits by virtue of its exclusive use of the intel-
lectual property protected technology.129  Both the U.S. and the 
  
 125. Hull et al., supra note 114, at 37 (“the decision in IMS Health raises 
significant concerns for intellectual property owners because the Commission 
expanded third parties’ rights of access to proprietary information under Arti-
cle 82”).  
 126. There are national competition law systems which complement the EC 
Treaty provisions. Julian M. Joshua & Donald C. Klawiter, The UK ‘Crimi-
nalization’ Initiative, ANTITRUST MAG., Summer 2002, at 68.  “While some 
national competition regimes are similar to that of the EU, the relationship 
between the EC and the national systems has never been seamless…No gen-
eral jurisdictional rule defines a bright line between those agreements subject 
to EC competition rules and those covered by national laws.”  Id. 
 127. Donna M. Gitter, The Conflict in the EC between Competition Law and 
Intellectual Property Rights: A Call for Legislative Clarification of the Essen-
tial Facilities Doctrine,  40 AM. BUS. L.J. 217, 221–22 (2003) (citing Opinion of 
Advocate General Jacobs, 1998 E.C.R. at I-7802, [1999] 4 C.M.L.R. at 124):  
The contradictions inherent in any effort to reconcile intellectual 
property rights and competition law are exemplified by the “essential 
facilities” doctrine, one of the analytic tools invoked by the Commis-
sion and the EC Courts to enhance market competition. This doctrine 
provides that “a company which has a dominant position in the provi-
sion of facilities which are essential for the supply of goods or services 
on another market abuses its dominant position where, without ob-
jective justification, it refuses access to those facilities.”  
Id.  
 128. Badal & Ware, supra note 46, at 2.  
 129. COMPETITION POLICY, supra note 32. 
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EU use the doctrine as a way of measuring whether abusive 
conduct has taken place however their application differs.130  
The EU uses the doctrine to assess a duty to license the intel-
lectual property deemed essential to participation in the mar-
ket.  Conversely, the U.S. has resisted this application.131  “Even 
where the intellectual property right is alleged to be an essen-
tial facility…courts have held that the owner of the intellectual 
property does not violate the antitrust laws by unilaterally re-
fusing to license to a competitor….”132  In the EU, the essential 
facilities doctrine is grounded in Article 82 of the Treaty of Am-
sterdam133 in its proscription against abuse of a dominant posi-
tion.134  The essential facilities doctrine applied to intellectual 
property rights reflects the tendency in the EU to devalue these 
rights in favor of “competition” principles, which may ultimately 
result in disincentives for achieving market dominance in the 
EU by virtue of these rights.135  
In IMS Health, the essential facilities doctrine was utilized 
and the licensing of intellectual property was called a “a pre-
requisite for effective competition” in the market.136  The court 
in IMS Health drew upon the standards set in Oscar Bronner, 
calling for a determination of whether (1) “the refusal of access 
to the facility is likely to eliminate all competition in the rele-
vant market; (2) such refusal is not capable of being objectively 
justified; and (3) the facility itself is indispensable to carrying 
on business, inasmuch as there is no actual or potential substi-
tute in existence for that facility.”137   
  
 130. Id.  
 131. Id.  This differing approach between the European Union and the 
United States “has substantial ramifications for companies possessing a 
dominant position in the market, even if they have achieved that position 
lawfully by way of copyright.”  Id. 
 132. Kobak, Antritrust Treatment of Refusals, supra note 6, at 619. 
 133. Treaty of Amsterdam Amending the Treaty on European Union, the 
Treaties Establishing the European Communities and Certain Related Acts, 
Oct. 2, 1997, 1997 O.J. (C 340), 37 I.L.M. 56, incorporated into the Treaty 
Establishing the European Community, Feb. 7, 1992, O.J. (C 224) 1 (1992), 
[1992] 1 C.M.L.R. 573 (1992), art. 141(4) (as in effect in 1999). 
 134. Gitter, supra note 127, at 227. 
 135. Marquardt & Mark Leddy, supra note 5, at 848–50. 
 136. Case T-184/01 R, para. 63  IMS Health Inc. v. Commission (Aug. 10, 
2001), confirmed after oral hearing, Oct. 26, 2001. 
 137. Case T-184/01 R, para. 70  IMS Health Inc. v. Commission (Aug. 10, 
2001), confirmed after oral hearing, Oct. 26, 2001. 
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In Volvo v. Veng, the Court of Justice was presented with the 
first case dealing with whether the refusal to license an intel-
lectual property right could be considered abusive.138  Volvo was 
the owner of a registered design of the front wings of the auto-
mobile.139  Veng manufactured and imported the panels in the 
United Kingdom without permission and Volvo contended that 
Veng was therefore infringing their exclusive right to manufac-
ture and sell the parts.140  The court held that refusal to grant 
third parties a license on these parts was not, in itself, an abuse 
of a dominant position.141  The court’s holding was based upon 
the particular factual circumstances, namely that Veng had no 
intention to innovate.  Additionally, the court considered the 
related policy consideration that “free riding” should not be 
facilitated through the invocation of community antitrust law.142  
Notwithstanding this holding, however, the court chose to leave 
the opportunity open for attacking a company’s refusal to li-
cense via antitrust law by stating that in some circumstances 
this type of conduct could be considered abusive.143  
Magill established the standards according to which intellec-
tual property ownership and refusal to license may constitute 
an abuse and breach of competition laws.144  The case involved a 
broadcast company’s refusal to license program schedules to a 
publishing company interested in publishing a television guide.  
Based on the impact the refusal to license had on a secondary 
market and that it had prohibited the entrance of a new product 
on the market, the European Court of Justice held that compul-
sory licensing was an appropriate remedy.145  
In Magill, the court stressed that in “exceptional circum-
stances” the refusal to license would not be justified by a valid 
intellectual property right.146  The holding, however, left open 
  
 138. Case 238/87, AB Volvo v. Erik Veng (UK) Ltd., ECR 6211, 4 C.M.L.R. 
122 (1988).  See also Forrester, Abuse of Intellectual Property, supra note 65, 
at 40.  
 139. Id. 
 140. Id. 
 141. Id. 
 142. Forrester, Abuse of Intellectual Property, supra note 65, at 41.  
 143. Id.  
 144. Cases 241 & 242/91P, Radio Telefis Eireann v. Commission, 1995 
C.M.L.R. 718, para. 50 (1995).  
 145. Id. 
 146. Id. 
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the question of whether the exceptional circumstances necessar-
ily involved restriction of secondary markets and of new prod-
ucts, or whether one of the two circumstances would suffice to 
fall under the rubric of abusive conduct.147  Unlike the situation 
in Magill, the court in Tierce Ladbroke found in part that a sec-
ondary market was not snuffed out by the refusal of the makers 
of horse racing videos to grant a license of the video recordings 
to a betting chain because the chain was already present on the 
secondary market.148  In Tierce Ladbroke, the fact that the fail-
ure to license did not preclude the development of a secondary 
market was discussed in the court’s decision alongside the find-
ing that the refusal to license was not abusive enough to meet 
the “exceptional circumstances” standard necessary for the 
court to force the defendants to issue a license.149  
In the early 1970’s, the European Court of Justice began us-
ing the “doctrine of  Community exhaustion” in deciding its 
cases involving the abuse or exclusive use of intellectual prop-
erty rights.150  Under this doctrine, once an intellectual property 
owner produces the protected good and it enters the market, the 
right is exhausted and therefore a parallel right in another 
member state cannot exclude the good from entering the mem-
ber state.151  This approach again illustrates the way in which 
EU law emphasizes the need for integration, instead of protect-
ing investments and the incentive to innovate through the pro-
tection of intellectual property rights.  The doctrine of exhaus-
tion as it applies to intellectual property rights continues to 
hold sway in certain cases in the EU.152  However, there have 
been certain cases where the doctrine of exhaustion has been 
diffused, as in Tierce Ladbroke,153 where it was held that the 
  
 147. Hull et al., supra note 114, at 37.  
 148. Anderman, New Economy, supra note 23, at 5. 
 149. “The CFI in Ladbroke did not find an abuse of a dominant position, 
primarily because the dominant firms were not present on the relevant mar-
ket and the intellectual property at issue was not indispensable for competi-
tion on that market.” Hull et al., supra note 114, at 37.   
 150. Korah, supra note 58, at 805–06.  
 151. Laurinda L. Hicks & James R. Holbein, Convergence of National Intel-
lectual Property Norms in International Trading Agreements, 12 AM. U.J. INT’L 
L. & POL’Y 769 (1997).   
 152. Korah, supra note 58, at 806.  
 153. Case T-504/93, Tierce Ladbroke SA v. Commission, ECR p. II-923 
(1997). 
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licensing of an intellectual property right does not exhaust the 
right.154  
VIII. FASHIONING EU INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS 
A possible solution to the impasse between EU-wide competi-
tion law and state-endowed intellectual property rights would 
be to form EU-wide intellectual property rights.  This would 
provide uniformity and would at the very least afford more clar-
ity and notice for companies doing business in the EU.155  De-
pending on the nature and scope of the intellectual property 
protection, companies may still be reluctant to expose their 
technology or services where their success, and consequent 
market dominance, may mean susceptibility to scrutiny under 
competition laws.156  However, in the climate of the EU, more 
narrowly tailored intellectual property rights would have the 
dual effects of easier compatibility with competition laws — 
which would perhaps encourage the abandonment of policies 
like forced licensing — and the public policy benefit of facilitat-
ing technological advancement by allowing innovation to build 
upon predecessors.157  Where the intellectual property right is 
too broad, there is little incentive or room for advancement of 
the relevant technology or service.158  
  
 154. Id. 
 155. Badal and Ware, supra note 46, at A15.  “Licensing or refusal-to-license 
decisions that are likely to be permissible under U.S. law may not be approved 
by the E.C., which then presents the difficult question of how to proceed —
indeed, whether to proceed at all — in light of the different legal status of the 
same licensing action.”  Id.  
 156. Abbott B. Lipsky, Jr., The Evolving Architecture of International Law: 
The Global Antitrust Explosion: Safeguarding Trade and Commerce or Run-
away Regulation?, 26 FLETCHER F. WORLD AFF. 59, 62–63 (2002). 
 157. See Pitofsky, supra note 1, at 919.  Pitofsky explains:  
Indeed, competition may be especially important where innovation is 
concerned, in order to preserve a diversity of approaches which will 
often prove essential to advance knowledge and discovery. The his-
tory of innovation since the monolithic AT&T was broken up is some 
evidence that innovation is more likely to thrive in the presence of 
competition than in its absence. 
Id. 
 158. Korah, supra note 58, at 830 (stating that “[i]n Magill, the intellectual 
property rights were wider than are usually granted in Europe or elsewhere. 
In Oscar Bronner, Advocate General Jacobs suggested that this may be the 
reason why a compulsory license was in effect granted”). 
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There are also temporal considerations involved in deciding 
whether to narrow or broaden the scope of  intellectual property 
rights.159  If the intellectual property right is more broadly 
drawn, perhaps it should protect the innovation for a shorter 
period, and if it is narrowly drawn, it would extend for a longer 
period.160  Striking a proper legislative balance between the 
scope of the right and the time limits surrounding the exclusiv-
ity of the right would serve a number of interests.  First, it 
would provide exclusivity in the interest of enhancing the in-
centive to innovate while clearly delineating where the intellec-
tual property right will be open to competition law scrutiny.161  
Additionally, it would satisfy the interests of providing the 
amount of exposure and opportunity to market participants 
that is necessary to encourage the continued development of the 
product or device.162  This is particularly true in the realm of 
rapidly developing, nascent technologies.163 
  
 159. Id at 811.  Korah states:  
Economists cannot tell us how strong protection of intellectual prop-
erty rights should be.  Whatever the law dictates, there may be insuf-
ficient inducements to investment in research and development. If 
patent protection is too strong, the incentives to derivative research 
and development are insufficient.  A license under the basic patent 
will have to be negotiated and any reward will have to be shared with 
its holder. The holder of the basic patent may not be under competi-
tive pressure to improve the technology.  If protection is less strong 
and the holder of an improvement patent is entitled to a compulsory 
license, the incentive to invest in the basic technology may be insuffi-
cient. 
Id.  
 160. Nancy Gallini & Michael Trebilcock, Competition Policy and Intellec-
tual Property Rights in the Knowledge-Based Economy, Intellectual Property 
Rights and Competition Policy: A Framework for Analysis of Economic and 
Legal Issues (OECD Competition Roundtable No. E18, 1997), available at 
http://www.oecd.org//daf/clp/Roundtables/ipr00.htm (last visited Jan. 5. 2004).  
 161. Id. 
 162. Gitter, supra note 127, at 296–97.  
It is essential that EC legislators address the intersection between 
intellectual property rights and competition law in order to attract 
foreign direct investment. U.S. firms in particular are loath to pursue 
investment opportunities in the face of insecure intellectual property 
rights, especially in light of the traditional antipathy inherent in U.S. 
law toward compulsory licensing.  Due to several economic and socio-
political factors, however, the EC is unlikely to abandon the compul-
sory licensing remedy in competition cases involving intellectual 
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Tightly bound to the notions of encouraging competition while 
protecting intellectual property rights and the incentive to in-
novate is the EU approach to research and development.  The 
Commission acknowledges the “important role in the knowledge 
economy” of state aid to research and development.164  Along 
these lines, the Commission seeks to raise total European in-
vestment in research and development to 3% of the EU’s gross 
domestic product, which would constitute an approximately 1% 
rise from the current allotment.165  The Commission seeks to 
affect this increase by exempting smaller companies from com-
petition rules and providing state aid to research and develop-
ment.166  These values, of encouraging research and develop-
ment, and the ostensible goal of encouraging innovation, exist 
alongside the EU’s priorities of making certain that these tech-
nological innovations are accessible to consumers.167  This latter 
goal is effected by enforcing strict adherence to competition 
laws.168 
Just as an innovator needs incentive to create the technology 
or product that will be protected by an intellectual property 
right, the Commission needs incentive to actually do the pro-
tecting.169  This incentive is found in the conclusion that the na-
ture of the right and its holder are such that other innovations 
will stem from the right.170  In this way, there is incentive, for 
example, to protect an innovator who can most efficiently con-
tinue to develop the already protected technology or product.171  
  
property, though certain European scholars and  practitioners ques-
tion the wisdom of applying the essential facilities doctrine in such 
circumstances. 
Id.   
 163. Gallini & Trebilcock, supra note 160. 
 164. Daniel Dombey, R & E Plan for EU Small Business, FIN. TIMES, Sept. 
11, 2002, at P12.  
 165. Id.  Investment in research and development has been 1.9% in the 
European Union, while it has been about 2.7% in the U.S.  Id.  
 166. Id. 
 167. COMPETITION POLICY, supra note 32, at 273. 
 168. Id. 
 169. Id. 
 170. Id. 
 171. DIRECTORATE FOR FINANCIAL, FISCAL AND ENTERPRISE AFFAIRS, 
COMMITTEE ON COMPETITION POLICY, COMPETITION POLICY AND INTELLECTUAL 
PROPERTY RIGHTS, available at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/34/57/1920398. 
pdf  (last visited Feb. 10, 2004). 
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If the intellectual property right owner is not, however, in a po-
sition to most efficiently enhance the innovation or to dissemi-
nate it, the Commission will be more likely to find that it has 
less incentive to ensure the protection of that right.172  Instead, 
the right will be considered more flimsy and vulnerable to the 
attack of competition law.173  It is this subjective evaluation of 
the intellectual property right in light of competition law — ar-
guably exhibited in IMS — that presents a problem.174  This sub-
jective approach can “create uncertainty” about the enforceabil-
ity of an intellectual property right, while forcing an evaluation 
of whether one right is protected while another equally valid 
right is not.175  In Xerox, the court also addresses the danger of 
investigating the subjective motivation of the owner who re-
fuses to license through refusal to apply a rebuttable presump-
tion.176 
  
 172. Id.  
It is also argued (Deffains) that the protection of the original innova-
tor will be also the most efficient solution in cases where its holder is 
anyway the best suited to fully develop the follow-on developments.  
In such a case, a high degree of protection will induce him to actually 
engage in the development of those further innovations. The patent 
will allow him to monitor future developments and, at the same time, 
will help to reduce wasteful duplication of R&D efforts. 
Id.  
 173. Id. 
 174. Marquardt & Leddy, supra note 5, at 848.  Marqardt and Leddy discuss 
the application of the essential facilities doctrine wherever an intellectual 
property right results in substantial market power in the U.S.: 
Such amorphous standards threaten to underminethe basic rights of 
intellectual property holders  and the procompetitive system of incen-
tives and rewards created by Congress and the Constitution. How-
does one distinguish a legitimate refusal to license based upon a 
strategy to exploit the right exclusively from an illegitimate refusal to 
license based upon ‘anticompetitive’ intent? 
Id. 
 175. U.S. FTC CHIDES E.C. EFFORTS TO DODGE IMS RESEARCH PATENT, 
EUROPE DRUG & DEVICE REPORT (June 3, 2002) (Deputy Assistant Attorney 
General for International Antitrust and Policy Enforcement for the Antitrust 
Division of the U.S. Department of Justice William Kolasky comments that 
the Commission bases competition policy on “whether it thinks the intellec-
tual property rights in question are worth protecting.”).   
 176. Howley, supra note 54, at sec. 12, col. 1.  
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IX.   CONCLUSION 
Market dominance by a company can be intimidating to those 
vying to participate in the market, but it is never indefinite.177  
Although this is small consolation for companies interested in 
immediate participation in the market, too much judicial and 
legislative intervention in market forces, in terms of the long 
run disincentive to innovate, could be pernicious.178  This is be-
cause it often takes time to “undo” what the judiciary or legisla-
ture does,179 whereas the market can correct itself fairly rapidly 
if left untouched.180 
  
 177. See Pitofsky, supra note 1, at 915–16. 
 178. Id.  See also Opi, supra note 104, at 450 (citing Ronald W. Davis, The 
FTC's Intel Case: What Are the Limitations on “Throwing Your Weight 
Around?” Using Intellectual Property Rights?, 13 ANTITRUST 47 (1999)).  (“Any 
legal rule, either based on the essential facilities doctrine or the leveraging 
theory, that may decrease the value of IPRs by limiting or qualifying an IP 
owner's right to the exclusive use of its own property, risks drastically reduc-
ing the incentive to innovate.” ). 
 179. Frank H. Easterbrook, The Limits of Antitrust, 63 TEX. L. REV. 1, 15 
(1984) (“[T]he economic system corrects monopoly more readily than it cor-
rects judicial errors. There is no automatic way to expunge mistaken decisions 
of the Supreme Court. A practice once condemned is likely to stay condemned, 
no matter its benefits.”). 
 180. See Pitofsky, supra note 1, at 915–16. 
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In an ideal statutory system, a company should be able to ex-
ercise the right to the exclusive control granted by intellectual 
property without concern regarding infringement of competition 
laws.181  As the holding in Xerox highlights, as long as companies 
remain within the statutory bounds of the intellectual property 
right, the exercise of that right should not conflict with anti-
trust law.182  It is possible that the conflict between the two bod-
ies of law in the EU stems from the combination of intellectual 
property rights that are too broadly drawn and antitrust law 
that is too narrowly applied.183  Ultimately, the enforcement of a 
statutory right should not be capable of triggering the antitrust 
law, and if it does, the statutory right should be re-drawn so 
that it does not come into conflict with the antitrust law, or vice 
versa.184  
Meg Buckley* 
 
  
 181. Certainly, in exceptional cases where fraud or frivolous infringement 
suits are involved, an intellectual property right owner should not be immune 
from violation of competition laws.  
 182. In re Indep. Serv. Orgs., 203 F.3d 1322, 1329 (Fed. Cir. 2000).  
 183. Korah, supra note 58, at 811 (discussing Magill).    
 184. Howley, supra note 50, at sec. 12, col. 1. 
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